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The gist of modal epistemology is expressed in the idea that you fail to 
know if you do believe truly but it is seriously possible for you to believe 
falsely. According to subjunctivism, this idea is captured by certain sub-
junctive conditionals. One formulation invokes a safety condition—“If S 
had believed P, then P would have been the case,” while the other invokes 
a sensitivity condition—“If P had been false, S would not have believed 
that P.” According to simple subjunctivism, such conditionals do not con-
trapose and Sosa derives important epistemological consequences which 
favor safety from this difference. However, simple subjunctivism is inad-
equate. I return to Goodman and his analysis of factuals and propose 
modal stability, which is restricted sensitivity or enhanced safety as a 
proper epistemic condition for the non-accidental connection between the 
basis for the belief and the relevant facts of the matter. The idea of modal 
stability combines robustness (benefi ts of safety) with responsiveness to 
facts (benefi ts of sensitivity) and recovers the original motivation for the 
relevant alternatives theory—when testing for claims of knowledge that p 
we ask what might be the case if not-p, but we ignore irrelevant possibili-
ties. Epistemic modal conditions should be expressed in terms of condi-
tionals of connection which contrapose within the limits of relevance.
Keywords: Modal epistemology, safety, sensitivity, Sosa, condition-
als, Goodman, contraposition.
1.
“Even if p had been false, you would have believed it anyway,” looks 
like a good reason for denying that one knows that p. Formulated in 
1 The fi rst (but very distant) version of this paper was presented at the June 2007 
Bled (Slovenia) philosophical conference “Epistemology.” An expanded version was 
presented at the November 2009 workshop “Intentionality” (Philosophy Department 
of the University Graz, Austria). I would like to thank the participants for their 
comments.
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positive terms, one could paraphrase a famous line from Shakespeare: 
belief counts as knowledge only if it “alters when it alteration (in facts) 
fi nds.”2 Belief (as opposed to, perhaps, love), if it is to be promoted to 
knowledge, should be fi nely dependent on facts. However, how fi ne is 
fi ne enough and what if one did not easily believe that p without be-
ing right? It is tempting to say that belief can still be a good candi-
date for knowledge, even if it does not always alter when it alteration 
fi nds. Only when it is seriously possible for you to falsely believe that 
p, do we have a good enough reason for denying your knowledge that p. 
Alternation within limits looks like a plausible reconciliation of these 
two intuitions. What counts as serious is usually specifi ed in terms of 
modal distance—how far is a certain possibility from the actual world. 
Modal distance maps the strength of the connection between one’s be-
lief that p and the fact p—if the possibility of believing falsely is close, 
then there is no connection, or a very unstable one. Within a space 
of nearby possibilities, modal connection requires that a belief should 
“alter when it alteration fi nds,” as for very distant possibilities, well, 
even love will shatter should your beloved one be transformed into a 
monstrous vermin. The old Platonic insight that knowledge is at least a 
non-accidentally true belief is then interpreted as the idea that knowl-
edge requires a modally stable connection between the belief and the 
relevant facts of the matter.
This picture is rough but familiar. Many versions of contemporary 
reliabilism impose modal conditions on knowledge, understood as a 
certain necessity, non-accidentality, or anti-luck condition. According 
to Unger (1968), S knows that P just in case it is “not at all accidental 
that S is right about its being the case that P.” It not being accidental 
that one is right about P amounts to there being something in one’s 
situation that guarantees, or makes it highly probable, that one were 
not wrong. Externalism in general is sometimes expressed in these 
terms: you can know something noninferentially, without reasoning 
from prior knowledge, so long as it is no accident or coincidence that 
you are right (Sosa 1997: 419). The notion of serious possibility comes 
from Goldman’s development of reliabilism with respect to perceptual 
knowledge (1976: 775). The position I develop in this paper is, in a 
certain sense, simply a generalization of Goldman’s (1986: 46): “A true 
belief fails to be knowledge if there are any relevant alternative situ-
ations in which the proposition p would be false, but the process used 
will cause S to believe p anyway.”
According to Zalabardo (2012: 4) “Reliabilism ...is the view that 
whether a true belief has the status of knowledge depends on how the 
natural order connects the state of affairs the belief consists in with 
the state of affairs whose obtaining determines the truth value of the 
belief—that is, S’s belief that p with p.” I agree with the centrality of 
2 Love is not love / Which alters when it alteration fi nds (Shakespeare, Sonnet 
116)
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connection—knowledge must be underwritten by some kind of stable 
modal connection. What is the profi le of this connection? First, what 
are the relata? The state of affairs or the fact that p is more or less 
uncontroversial, but the epistemic relatum is not a simple belief that 
p. Various proposals include: evidence for p; (conclusive) reason for the 
belief that p (Dretske 1971); experiential reasons for the belief (Sosa 
2004a); a basis for the belief (Sosa 2002); a belief based on a method 
which indicates that p; or simply a method of belief formation (Luper 
2012: 210). Relativisation is necessary for various reasons. Here is sim-
ple a case based on Luper (based on Nozick). I believe that Mary, my 
daughter, is well because I see her playing tennis, but if she weren’t 
I’d believe she was through wishful thinking. Suppose she just made a 
dangerous move, overstretching her arm, which might easily have led 
to a ruptured biceps. My true belief about her well-being is based on 
perception, but (in the case of her injury) I might easily believe false-
ly, by way of wishful thinking. Still, the possibility of my using a bad 
method does not discredit my perceptual knowledge of her well-being.
The possibility of applying a different method of belief formation 
suggests that non-accidentality might be understood as having mul-
tiple dimensions (cf. Yamada 2010).3 Bogardus (2012) presents a nice 
analogy with bridges—methods of acquiring knowledge are like bridg-
es to one’s destination. If Godzilla is rampaging through the area, even 
the world’s sturdiest bridge might be in danger. It may be false that, 
were one to take the bridge, one would arrive at one’s destination. Yet, 
if Godzilla has not yet hit the bridge, it remains as sturdy as you like. 
In one dimension it is no accident that you safely crossed the river us-
ing this bridge; in another dimension you were simply lucky. Various 
cases of accidental knowledge which are supposed to show that modal 
condition is not necessary for knowledge might in the end just show 
that the one-dimensional space of possible worlds (measuring the prox-
imity of a simple belief-fact mismatch) is just not pliable enough to map 
all of our epistemic intuitions.
I will avoid complications, however, and mainly work with the sim-
ple idea that knowledge must be underwritten by some kind of stable 
modal connection between the truth of the belief and the epistemic ba-
sis for the belief. The modal nature of the connection indicates that ac-
tual true belief is insuffi cient for knowledge; true belief in some range 
of counterfactual situations is also required. Which range? Two differ-
ent ways to characterize them have been extensively discussed. Here 
is Black (2011: 189):
First, to say that Smith’s belief is true simply as a matter of luck might 
be to say that there is nothing about Smith’s circumstances, in which his 
belief happens to be true, that ensures that he will believe that C—even if 
C had been false, Smith might nonetheless have believed that C. This way 
of giving expression to our anti-luck intuition corresponds to epistemologies 
known as sensitivity theories...
3 Engel (1992) already introduces different dimensions of epistemic luck.
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Next, to say that Smith’s belief is true simply as a matter of luck might be to 
say that there is nothing about that which led Smith to believe that C that 
ensures that C will be true—it might have been that Smith’s circumstances 
are just as they actually are, but that his belief that C is false. This way of 
giving expression to our anti-luck intuition corresponds to modal episte-
mologies known as safety theories...
Well, what is the difference? Lucky belief, only accidentally connected 
with facts of the matter, in terms of safety, is a belief held by Smith 
such that the basis for Smith’s belief that C does not ensure the truth 
of C. It is possible that Smith’s circumstances are just as they actually 
are, but that his belief that C is false. Not quite so. Smith’s circum-
stances are not exactly as they actually are; in this possible situation 
the facts about C must have changed for his belief to be false. Which 
is to say: if C had been false, Smith might nonetheless have believed 
that C on the same basis (in roughly the same circumstances). So his 
belief is not sensitive. This looks very much like a difference without a 
difference.
I do not deny that it is possible to understand the passages quoted 
in a way which does not minimize the difference. Still, I will argue that 
the two characterizations of one’s failure to know are just two perspec-
tives on a broken liaison: (i) Smith’s basis for his belief that C does not 
depend on the fact that C; (ii) Smith’s basis for his belief that C does 
not indicate the truth of C. A standard way to spell out the difference is 
to express the two conditions in terms of subjunctive conditionals. Ac-
cording to subjunctivism,4 a true belief rises to knowledge just in case 
certain subjunctives about the truth of that belief hold. A belief that p 
is safe iff
SAF S would believe that p only if p were true. (Alternatively: S would 
have believed that p only if p had been true.)
And a belief that p is sensitive iff
SEN If p were false then S would not believe that p. (Alternatively: If 
p had been false then S would not have believed that p.)
SEN is almost universally interpreted in accordance with the Lewis-
Stalnaker account of such conditionals: in the closest (sometimes the 
nearest) world in which p is false, S does not believe that p.5 I will 
call a combination of the SAF, SEN and standard possible worlds in-
terpretation of the subjunctives involved simple subjunctivism. Simple 
subjunctivism cannot be quite right—when p and q are both true, it 
is an artifact of these kind of semantics that “if p were the case, then 
q would be the case” is automatically true, since the actual world is 
more similar to itself than any other world (and q is true in the ac-
tual world). True beliefs will then automatically be safe—not what we 
want, no luck eliminated, so a different interpretation has to be used 
4 A term used by Fogelin (1994) and Vogel (2007).
5 Cf. Black (2011: 189), Alspector-Kelly (2011: 129); Vogel (2012: 122) as a sample 
list.
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for safety (true/true) conditionals. However, I think one should play the 
game of epistemic modal conditions consistently and with the same set 
of rules, motivated by the idea of modal connection. Although a good 
deal of thought has gone into the details concerning how the safety and 
sensitivity conditions should be interpreted, this point has not been 
appreciated suffi ciently.
Consider the notion of the closest possible world(s). What exactly 
counts as the closest is open to discussion, but some have taken close 
possible worlds to be nearby worlds (Rysiew 2006: 275). This may lead 
to confusion—the closest need not be nearby. The closest non-human 
inhabited planet might be in the Gliese 1 system, so far, far away, but 
still closer than, say the Gliese 876 star system. However, there are 
no nearby non-human inhabited planets: there are none in our Solar 
system and its vicinity, Alpha Centauri, for instance. When speaking 
about sensitivity in terms of simple subjunctivism, I will use the notion 
of close worlds (which need not be nearby), and I will reserve the notion 
of being nearby for those worlds which are “really” near (in roughly the 
way that Venus is near to Earth and Gliese 1 is not; the question of how 
to measure distances in modal space is a vexed one).
Let me now state the problem for sensitivity understood in terms of 
simple subjunctivism: in some cases the closest non-p possibility is not 
a serious option at all and in some cases the closest non-p possibility 
is not the only serious option. Radical skeptical scenarios belong to the 
fi rst type—we are told, for instance, to imagine the remote possibil-
ity that at this very moment we are a brain hooked up to a sophisti-
cated computer program that can perfectly simulate experiences of the 
outside world. Is this possibility nevertheless relevant for my actual 
knowledge that I am not a victim of a brain-in-a-vat illusion? I do not 
think so, although this is controversial. I will touch upon this again 
later.
Goldman (1983: 84) illustrates the second case with the following 
scenario:
Sam correctly believes that Judy is before him, but if it were Judy’s twin sis-
ter instead, he would mistake her for Judy. Then, as long as the twin sister’s 
being there is a serious possibility, Sam doesn’t know that Judy is before 
him. Suppose that what would be the case if Judy weren’t before Sam is that 
nobody would be there, and if nobody were there, Sam wouldn’t believe that 
Judy is there. Then Sam’s bid for knowledge survives Nozick’s condition (3), 
and nothing else in the analysis is able to defeat it.
Nozick’s condition (3) is just SEN. It is clear that more no-Judy possi-
bilities should be considered, not just the closest one and only. It might, 
after all, be merely a happy accident that Sam sees Judy—the connec-
tion between the basis of his belief and Judy’s presence is not stable. 
The profi le of modal connection is not adequately captured by the sen-
sitivity condition as stated by simple subjunctivism. Goldman objects 
that Nozick’s analysis does not make reference to serious possibilities; 
it talks about what would be the case if p weren’t true. It is not so 
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clear that conditionals expressing modal connection should be about 
the closest possibility only—sensitivity is a technical notion, after all. 
But I agree that an overly simplistic understanding of the subjunctives 
involved obscures the nature of modal connection. A more sophisticated 
semantics is usually offered,6 but then simple subjunctivism faces the 
problem that explanans, an adequate account of subjunctive condition-
als, might turn out to be more complicated than explanandum, the 
analysis of epistemic modal connection.
Let me try a different approach. I started with the intuition that a 
proper modal connection is a necessary condition for knowledge and 
this necessity was formulated in terms of a conditional of disconnec-
tion (let us ignore, for the time being, the problem of the epistemic 
relatum):
SEM Even if p were false, S would believe it anyway.
SEM is a semifactual denying that S knows that p. Goodman (1991: 
11) introduced the phrase ‘semifactual’ for a conditional with a false 
antecedent and true consequent in contrast to the ‘counterfactual’ in 
which both the antecedent and consequent are false. For Goodman, 
in practice, full counterfactuals affi rm while semifactuals deny that a 
certain connection obtains between antecedent and consequent. Liter-
ally, however, a semifactual and the corresponding counterfactual are 
not contradictories but contraries, and both may be false. SEM has the 
force of denying “if p had been false, you would not have believed it,” 
but it is actually stronger than required for a denial of SEN. Both Noz-
ick (1981: 199) and Dretske (1971: 9–10) were aware of the fact that a 
proper denial of SEN is:
 If p were false, then S might still believe that p. (Alternatively: 
If p had been false, then S might have believed that p.)
So,
D1 S might have believed that p, (even) if p were false.
is enough to deny knowledge. How about:
D2 p might be false, even though S were to believe that p?
I think that the denials are equivalent within the same range of nearby 
worlds. Let me use the following example as an analogy for an acci-
dental correlation (Wikipedia): “Since the 1950’s, both the atmospheric 
CO2 level and obesity levels have increased sharply.” But atmospheric 
CO2 does not cause obesity, rather, richer populations tend to eat more 
food and consume more energy. So we have:
D1’ Obesity might increase even though the level of atmospheric 
CO2 would not.
But also:
6 Nozick (1981: 680–681) avoids the trivial truth of factuals by adopting a rather 
complicated semantics for true-true conditionals.
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D2’ The level of atmospheric CO2 might not increase even though 
obesity would increase.
Both conditionals are true in the same possible situations, those in 
which obesity increases but the level of atmospheric CO2 does not. Still, 
the perspective is different: we tend to understand the fi rst conditional 
as stating that the level of obesity does not track (is independent of) the 
level of atmospheric CO2. We could understand the second conditional 
as stating that the level of atmospheric CO2 does not track (is inde-
pendent of) the level of obesity (just think of cows and methane they 
produce). However, given certain background assumptions about the 
direction of causation (from CO2 to obesity) it seems more plausible to 
suppose that D2’ states that the level of obesity is not a good indication 
of the level of atmospheric CO2.
In terms of epistemic conditions, D1 is offi cially a denial of 
“sensitivity”—our bases for beliefs do not track (are independent of) the 
relevant facts. D2 is a denial of “safety,” our bases for beliefs do not in-
dicate the relevant facts. According to one of Sosa’s formulations (Sosa 
2002), for a belief to be safe it must be based on a reliable indication. 
Or, to use the formulation of safety by Black, there is nothing about 
that which leads us to have reasons for the belief that p that ensures 
that p will be true. Still, the “truthmaker” for D1 and D2 is the same—
a (relevantly similar) possible situation in which one falsely believes 
that p. D1 (dependency) and D2 (indication) are two perspectives on 
a modal disconnection representing two aspects of a proper epistemic 
connection: stability and responsiveness to facts. Safety corresponds 
to stability and robustness—modal states that concern what could not 
easily have happened (cf. Williamson 2000: 123). The aspect of sensi-
tivity is the aspect of responsiveness to changes and dependency on 
facts—knowledge attribution depends on whether S’s belief that p (or, 
the cognitive processes responsible for the production of that belief) is 
responsive to whether p, whether S would believe that p even if some 
not-p alternative were in fact the case (Goldman 1976: 85). Both are 
conditions of reliability and they should extensionally co-vary—within 
reasonable limits!
Responsiveness to changes is often explained in terms of the sub-
ject’s possession of certain discriminative capacities (cf. Rysiew 2006). 
Let us therefore take an underwater camera as our analogy for a cogni-
tive, belief forming mechanism. There are two aspects of a good picture 
taking mechanism: (i) responsiveness to environment (making good 
and recognizable pictures in variable conditions); (ii) good housing, ro-
bustness, stability—the camera should not break easily. The fi rst re-
quirement corresponds to sensitivity and the second to safety. A cam-
era which easily breaks is unsafe and not a good camera and neither 
is a camera with poor sensitivity that produces blurred pictures. It is 
true that 11.000 m under the water the camera might become dys-
functional. It is also true that our belief forming mechanisms become 
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dysfunctional when subjected to radical skeptical scenarios. However, 
these are extreme conditions, as a camera that does not work 11.000 m 
under the water can still be a good underwater camera. Discrimination 
under not too-farfetched conditions makes for a solid camera, while 
discrimination within reasonable limits of relevant possibilities is good 
enough for knowledge (or better, necessary, as there might be other 
conditions for knowledge).
Note that the failure of stability (“unsafety”) and the failure of re-
sponsiveness (“insensitivity”) are usually explained in the same way. 
Consider the familiar Russell-Gettier case in which Mrs. Smith forms 
a true belief about what the time is (“It is 5 o’clock in the afternoon”) 
by looking at a stopped clock, one that just happens to be showing the 
right time. In the closest not-5-o’clock world Mrs. Smith would still 
believe it is 5-o’clock; her belief is not sensitive. Why? Because she is 
unable to discriminate the “5 o’clock in the afternoon—world” from the 
relevant but incompatible hypothesis. Also, Mrs. Smith could easily 
believe it is 5-o’clock even if the time were different; her belief is not 
safe. Why? Well, based on the evidence she has in these circumstances, 
Mrs. Smith is unable to discriminate between 5 o’clock and the relevant 
not-5 o’clock worlds. She is both easily prone to error and her belief is 
not responsive to facts because of her inability to tell apart the relevant 
alternatives.
In making these judgments, we should take into account those seri-
ously possible situations in which she falsely believes that p, but not 
those in which she fails to believe truly. Many have noticed that it is 
the modal proximity of a false belief that matters for the epistemic (dis)
connection, not the proximity of undetected truths. Sosa (2004b: 280) 
gives the following example:
If I see a large pelican alight on my garden lawn in plain view, I will know 
that there is a bird in my garden. And this is not affected by the fact that a 
small robin sits in the garden in its nest out of view. In such circumstances, 
there might very easily have been a bird in the garden without my believ-
ing it.
One might object that my belief that there is a bird is based on my 
pelican-experience, and there could not easily have been a bird in the 
garden without my believing it on this basis. How, exactly, should we 
individuate bases (reasons, methods)? This is a diffi cult problem that I 
will avoid; let me just say that the “pelican-experience” seems to be too 
fi ne-grained. Yet, there are many other cases. Luper (2012: 212) argues 
convincingly that we can know things based on reasons (methods) that 
miss instances (p is true but our method of knowing fails to indicate p), 
counter-instances (p is false but our method of knowing fails to indicate 
the falsity of p), or both. He gives the case of a gappy thermometer: if 
a person’s temperature is over 101°F, then the thermometer indicates 
a fever. People are feverish when their temperature is not over 101°F, 
but the thermometer will not indicate that such persons have fevers. 
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Suppose Frieda’s temperature is slightly over 101°F and the thermom-
eter indicates this fact. She might easily have 100.8°F degrees and be 
feverish without the thermometer indicating this. Still, using this ther-
mometer, we know she has a fever.
What counts as a denial of knowledge is the possibility of believ-
ing falsely, not the possibility of ignorance. We should avoid errors in 
similar cases as Williamson would say, but our potential failures to 
form beliefs do not discredit our claims of knowledge. This observa-
tion unites a theory of modal (dis)connection with its predecessor, the 
original relevant alternatives theory. If you know that p, then, in some 
sense, you “can’t be wrong” about p; there are no relevant possible situ-
ations in which you have the same basis for your belief, but p is false. 
Or, in other words, if it is seriously possible for S to falsely believe that 
p, then S fails to know that p.
Serious possibility is determined by modal distance, and it is hoped 
that modal distance captures relevance (modally far-away is irrel-
evant). Ideally, serious possibility, relevance and modal proximity 
should match. When in an anti-skeptical mood, philosophers tend to 
agree that irrelevant (radical skeptical) scenarios are far-away and not 
seriously possible, so they do not have an adverse impact on everyday 
knowledge. However, a theory of relevance is everybody’s problem. We 
might end up with a cheese like topology, a set of relevant possibilities 
that cannot be naturally seen as a “sphere” of nearby possible worlds 
but rather as a set of unconnected “islands” (Schaffer 2005: 125). Let’s 
hope that this is not the case and work with the usual, not entirely pre-
cise notion of relevance (for Goldman 2012: 69, for instance, a situation 
is relevant only if it is “realistic,” fairly likely to occur, or does occur in 
a nearby possible world).
3.
Simple subjunctivism is not an adequate formulation of epistemic mod-
al connection. We could avoid conditionals altogether and state modal 
conditions directly, by means of a possible-worlds heuristic.7 Or, we 
might try with a semantics that allows for a uniform treatment of mod-
al conditions and interpret epistemic modal conditions in terms of a 
special type of conditional. I am sympathetic to all of these approaches. 
Ideally, they should converge—I will try to rehabilitate a conditional of 
connection introduced by Goodman which allows for a uniform treat-
ment of factuals and counterfactuals and has truth-conditions which 
respect our epistemic modal intuitions when expressed in terms of pos-
sible worlds.
We ascribe a lack of knowledge that p to S when p is true and S 
believes that p on a basis b, but continues to believe that p (on this 
basis) in one of the seriously possible non-p worlds. In this case a semi-
7 This is proposed by Greco (2012: 194), who refers to Hawthorne.
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factual, a conditional of disconnection, is true: “Even if p were false, 
S might still believe that p on basis b”. For Goodman, in practice, full 
counterfactuals affi rm while semifactuals deny that a certain connec-
tion obtains between antecedent and consequent. However, the same 
connection can be expressed in terms of a factual. Goodman considers 
the case when we say of a piece of butter that was eaten yesterday and 
that had never been heated: “If that piece of butter had been heated to 
150°F, it would have melted.” He then remarks (Goodman 1991: 10):
The problem of counterfactuals is equally a problem of factual condition-
als, for any counterfactual can be transposed into a conditional with a true 
antecedent and consequent; e.g., “Since that butter did not melt, it wasn’t 
heated to 150°F.” That “since” occurs in the contrapositive shows that what 
is in question is a certain kind of connection between the two component 
sentences; …
This may or may not be the proper approach to analyzing counterfactu-
als in natural language, but it certainly looks like a good starting point 
for analyzing conditionals of connection. “Since X, Y” captures Sosa’s 
idea of safety, “Not easily X without Y.” In the same way as not-melting 
of the butter indicates its not-being heated, modal connection requires 
that the existence of S’s reasons (evidence, basis) for the belief that p 
—the way an object appears to S, for example—is a reliable indicator 
of the truth of p. For Sosa an agent S counts as knowing p only if S 
believes p by way of a safe “indication,” where indications are deliv-
erances of epistemic sources such as perception, memory, inference, 
etc. (Sosa 1999: 149 and Sosa 2002). Occasionally, he uses a different 
formulation: a belief that p is basis-relative safe, if and only if it has a 
basis that it would (likely) have only if true. The idea, however, is the 
same: the basis for p indicates the truth of p, or, in terms of a condi-
tional: “Since S believes that p on basis b, it is true that p.” Dretske’s 
(1971) notion of a conclusive reason R (S knows that P on the basis of 
R) could also be understood as “since R is the case, so is P.”
Not-melting of the butter does not cause its not-being heated, and 
reasons do not cause facts, so I will understand Goodman’s “since” con-
ditionals neutrally as expressing a connection without direction. They 
can be used causally. McCall (1983) uses “since” and “because” inter-
changeably to indicate a connection between the antecedent and conse-
quent and analyses a factual: “Since the butter was heated it melted,” 
which we naturally read as stating that the antecedent causes the con-
sequent. Let “A > B” stand for the conditional such that the proposition 
or state of affairs expressed by A bears a “connection” of a logical or no-
mological nature to that expressed by B. When A and B are both true, 
there are two conditionals of connection—a factual: “Since A, B,” and 
a corresponding contraposing counterfactual: “If B were not the case, 
then A would not be the case.” They are extensionally equivalent ac-
cording to Goodman and McCall. Epistemic conditionals connect a ba-
sis for a belief that p (‘Bbp’ is a proposition stating that S believes that 
p on a basis b) with the fact that p and I will understand ‘Since Bbp, 
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p’ as an indication (Bbp indicates p) and ‘If p were not the case, then 
Bbp would not be the case’ as dependency (Bbp depends on p). The fi rst 
conditional expresses the aspect of safety, and the second the aspect of 
sensitivity—but these are, following Goodman, just two aspects of one 
connection, which is to say that indication conditionals and dependency 
conditionals validly contrapose.
This is not a standard view, however. So, let us examine more close-
ly the rationale against contraposition. I will examine Sosa’s argument 
against contraposition in a special section. Suppose we understand 
safety in terms of simple subjunctivism as “If S were to believe p, p 
would be true,” or “BS p > p” and sensitivity as its contrapose: “¬p > 
¬BS p.” Let us also adopt a slightly modifi ed, Nozickian version of Stal-
naker/Lewis semantics for true/true subjunctives, so that “If S were 
to believe p, p would be true” is true if and only if p is true at all close 
worlds at which S believes p (not just the actual one). These condition-
als do not contrapose (Williamson 2000: 149):
BS p > p can be true and ¬p > ¬BS  p false if p is true at every close world but 
S believes p at the closest (but not close) world at which p is false. Equally, 
¬p > ¬BS  p can be true and BS p > p false if S believes p at some close but not 
closest worlds at which p is false.
Is this really decisive? S actually truly believes that p, but the closest 
world where S believes falsely is not nearby, so S’s belief is safe but not 
sensitive? True, this constitutes a problem for simple subjunctivism—
but we saw above how to reply: sensitivity has to be restricted and the 
closest worlds which are not nearby will then be irrelevant. This objec-
tion then loses its bite. Note also that Williamson ascribes to Nozick 
different semantical criteria for factuals (safety) and counterfactuals 
(sensitivity). Counterfactuals are interpreted according to standard 
Lewis semantics—“¬p > ¬BS  p” is true at a possible world w if and only 
if either ¬p is true at no possible world (the vacuous case) or, for at least 
one possible world x, ¬p is true at x and ¬BS  p is true at every possible 
world at least as close in the relevant respects as x is to w. Setting aside 
various qualifi cations (the possibility that there might be worlds that 
get closer and closer to the actual world without limit), we can say that 
this condition is true if and only if, in the closest non-p worlds, S does 
not believe that p. So we use close (nearby in my terminology) worlds 
for safety and the closest one(s) for sensitivity. But why the different 
standards?8 
Sensitive but not safe? S actually truly believes that p and there 
is a world nearby where S believes falsely, but this is not the closest 
world in the set of nearby worlds (at the closest world where p is false 
S does not believe that p). Goldman’s twins are an example—Sam cor-
8 To be fair, Williamson (2000: 152) considers the option of interpreting sensitivity 
“¬p > ¬BS p” as requiring the truth of its consequent at all contextually relevant 
worlds at which the antecedent is true. This view makes “BS p > p” and “¬p > ¬BS 
p” equivalent in any given context and is similar to the position defended in this 
paper.
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rectly believes that Judy is before him, but if it were Judy’s twin sister 
instead, he would mistake her for Judy. The possibility of Judy’s twin 
sister is nearby but it is not realized in the closest world. But is it not in 
this situation just a happy coincidence that Sam sees Judy? To repeat 
the moral—for a connection to be stable, it has to hold within a set of 
nearby worlds, not just the closest one(s). It would be unwise to permit 
the dependency conditional “¬p > ¬BS  p” to be true given that there is a 
world nearby where S believes falsely that p. In that case the connec-
tion is unstable; it might be only a happy accident that the closest not-p 
world is a world where it is not the case that S believes that p rather 
than a world where S believes that p.
I will adopt McCall’s proposal (1983) to model the idea of modal 
connection (as before, ‘Bbp’ is a proposition stating that S believes that 
p on a basis b). According to McCall, a counterfactual “not-p > not-Bbp” 
would be true iff some not-p & not-Bbp is closer to the actual world than 
any not-p & Bbp world. The key to the notion of connection lies in the 
requirement that not-p & Bbp worlds must in all cases lie outside the 
set of not-p & not-Bbp worlds, p & Bbp worlds and possibly also p & not-
Bbp worlds centered around the actual world (McCall 1983: 312). The 
last requirement does not hold in the case of epistemic connections—
possibilities where one fails to believe truly do not refute knowledge 
claims. However, when p and Bbp are both true the idea of a connection 
requires that for a factual Bbp > p to be true, some not-Bbp and not-p 
world must be closer to the actual world than any not-p & Bbp world. 
Given these semantics, factuals and counterfactuals of connection are 
extensionally equivalent within a set of nearby worlds. 
To see this, suppose that the actual world is a “p & Bbp” world, that 
a counterfactual “not-p > not-Bbp” is true but a factual “Bbp > p” is false. 
In this case some nearby not p-world is a Bbp-world. Consequently, it 
might be only a happy accident that the closest not-Bbp world x is a not-
p world: there is a world which is both near to this world x and to the 
actual world where not-Bbp & p. Next, suppose that the actual world is 
a “p & Bbp” world, that a factual “Bbp > p” is true, but a counterfactual 
“not-p > not-Bbp” is false. According to McCall (1983: 314), it would 
seem unwise to permit a factual “Bbp > p” to be true given that the clos-
est not-p worlds (nearby) were Bbp worlds, for in that case it might also 
be only a happy accident that the actual world was Bbp & p rather than 
a Bbp & not-p world. And if the closest not-p worlds are not nearby then 
we can exclude them on the grounds of irrelevance.
McCall develops a branched possible world model structure to de-
velop a semantics which corresponds with Goodman’s view—in cases 
where there exists a connection between the antecedent and the con-
sequent, contraposition holds. His model presupposes indeterminism 
and the details might be problematic, but I think that the general idea 
holds water. I am inclined to accept what Cogburn and Roland (2013: 
10) call a “Linguists’ Version of Lewis’s Semantics for Counterfactuals” 
for conditionals of connection:
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A conditional of the form, “if it were the case that p, it would be the case 
that q,” is true in context C and world w just in case either (i) there is no p-
world or (ii) if there is a p-world, then all (C, w)-relevantly similar p-worlds 
are q-worlds.
According to this condition indication conditionals (“safety”) and de-
pendency conditionals (“sensitivity”) contrapose within the context C 
(which we take to be the set of relevant worlds).9 By way of example, 
let us examine a paradigmatic case of failure of contraposition for coun-
terfactuals given by Nute in the reference book on conditionals (Nute 
1984: 394–395, his numbering):
24.  If it were to rain heavily at noon, the farmer would not irrigate 
his fi eld at noon.
25.  If the farmer were to irrigate his fi eld at noon, it would not rain 
heavily at noon.
I assume that the contrapose (25) is supposed to be “obviously” false 
because we tend to read (25) as if the farmer’s actions brought about or 
made it the case that it did not rain heavily, which is absurd. However, 
what if this suggestion is removed and we simply concentrate on a con-
nection without any particular direction? For instance:
25’ If the farmer were to have irrigated his fi eld at noon, it would 
not be the case that it has rained heavily at noon.
Or even better, to use one of Sosa’s formulations of safety conditionals 
(2004a: 40): 
25’’ It would not be so that the farmer irrigated his fi eld at noon 
without it being so that it had not rained heavily at noon.
This sounds awkward, but it seems to me that (25’’) now really follows 
from (24). Someone might truly say in the evening:
 Since the farmer irrigated his fi eld at noon, it was not the case 
that it had rained heavily at noon.
We may conjecture that in the case of a “connection” (understood very 
broadly) between the antecedent and the consequent, subjunctive con-
ditionals contrapose.
4.
The modal camp in general accepts the idea that if you believed that 
p even if p might (seriously) not be the case, then you fail to know 
that p. However, principles of safety and sensitivity are supposed to be 
two inequivalent ways to express our modal intuition regarding how 
our beliefs in genuine cases of knowledge should be connected with 
facts not just in the actual world, but also in a relevant range of pos-
sible worlds. Wrongly so, as I think that a proper modal connection 
9 The idea of equivalence within limits, but on different grounds, is defended by 
Ichikawa (2011: 311), Leplin (2009: 154), Luper (2012: 221–22) and Yamada (2010: 
78).
280 D. Šuster, Knowledge and Conditionals of (Dis)connection
requires reliability throughout a space of relevant counterfactual situ-
ations which encompasses both aspects. This position has been hinted 
at approvingly—Pritchard (2008: 453) says that a rendering of safety 
and sensitivity in which they are extensionally equivalent would be “a 
fascinating development.” On the other side such a proposal was criti-
cized (Greco 2012) but never fully developed.
Safety is a later arrival on the scene, developed as a criticism and 
improvement on sensitivity. I will address some of the criticism, but 
note, I have to address arguments for a distinction of the two condi-
tions and the superiority of safety, not the arguments against modal 
conditions in general (very often both conditions are in the same boat, 
e.g. with respect to the problems of closure). A typical argument has 
already been addressed—the alleged cases of sensitive but unsafe be-
liefs which intuitively do not count as knowledge. Sam truly believes 
that Judy is before him, but if it were her twin sister Trudy instead, 
he would mistake her for Judy. The closest possible world where his 
belief is false is a world where nobody stands before him (his belief is 
sensitive), but the possibility of Trudy being there is nearby (his belief 
is unsafe). The reply should be obvious by now: why consider just the 
closest (one and only) possible world as your interpretation of sensitiv-
ity? You have to consider more non-p worlds (not just the closest one), 
but not those which are irrelevant. Is this still sensitivity (properly un-
derstood) at all? Well, “what’s in a name?” Pritchard calls the proposed 
modal condition super-safety, while Greco calls it restricted sensitivity; 
I have used the name modal stability (Šuster 2013). Never mind the 
name—considerations about relevance, non-accidentality of a proper 
modal connection and the equal treatment of conditionals involved 
motivate the extensional equivalence of safety enhanced by sensitiv-
ity within a set of nearby worlds and sensitivity restricted to a set of 
nearby worlds.
One of the main arguments for the difference between the two condi-
tions has been the argument from contraposition, mainly developed by 
Sosa. Basically, safety and sensitivity expressed in terms of subjunctive 
conditionals are contrapositives, but since subjunctive conditionals do 
not contrapose, the conditions are different. Although long a proponent 
of safety, Sosa now thinks that though more adequate than the sen-
sitivity requirement, this requirement of safety is still inadequate, as 
knowledge requires aptness: for a true belief to be knowledge it must be 
apt—accurate because it is adroit and grounded in a broader intellec-
tual virtue or ability (Sosa 2007: 98). Safety still fi gures in his account of 
knowledge (e.g. an exercise of a competence is safe relative to its normal 
conditions if it would not easily have issued a false belief if exercised in 
those conditions) and some have argued that this condition is equiva-
lent to basis-relative safety (Fernandez 2010: 44). However, I agree with 
Comesana (2013) that modal conditions are no longer central to Sosa’s 
epistemology. Nevertheless, Sosa has done a great deal to develop the 
safety condition in its ability to give a better account of anti-skeptical 
 D. Šuster, Knowledge and Conditionals of (Dis)connection 281
knowledge than other modal conditions. There are also other proponents 
of safety and I think that the issue is still interesting by itself, so in the 
rest of the paper I will be concerned with Sosa-as-a-safety-advocate and 
his formulation of the argument from contraposition.
Here is Sosa’s reasoning in a nutshell: (i) sensitivity and safety ex-
pressed in terms of subjunctives (he calls them ‘strong’ conditionals) are 
inequivalent contrapositives; (ii) safety is more plausible than sensitiv-
ity; (iii) the plausibility of the sensitivity requirements derives from the 
corresponding safety requirements so easily confused with them through 
the failure to appreciate that strong conditionals do not contrapose. Sosa 
gives various reasons why safety is more defensible than sensitivity as a 
requirement for knowledge (inductive knowledge, knowledge of necessi-
ties, refl ective knowledge, Sosa 1999: 145–146). However, superiority is 
most striking in a Moorean response to radical skepticism.
Consider a typical skeptical scenario—in the closest brain-in-a-vat 
world (which is, we assume, far, far away) humans do not believe that 
they are envatted brains. This belief is insensitive but it remains safe, 
however, as I would not easily believe I was not a brain-in-a-vat without 
it being the case that I was not a brain-in-a-vat. There are no nearby 
worlds where humans are envatted brains. If sensitivity is required for 
knowledge then we do not know we are not radically deceived; If safety is 
required for knowledge, then we know that we are not radically deceived. 
This is the corner-stone of a (neo)-Moorean response to radical skepti-
cism as defended by Sosa (repeatedly provided in a number of places, 
even in the book where safety is superseded by aptness, Sosa 2007: 27):
A1. S’s true belief that she is not radically deceived is safe but insensitive.
A2. When expressed in terms of subjunctive conditionals, safety is a contra-
positive of sensitivity.
A3. Subjunctive conditionals do not contrapose.
A4. S can know that she is not radically deceived.
A5. Safety is a necessary condition for knowledge, but sensitivity is not.
A6. We easily confuse safety with sensitivity or at least think they are 
equivalent, because it is easy to assume that subjunctive conditionals con-
trapose. 
A7. S’s belief that that she is not radically deceived only appears not to be 
knowledge because it is insensitive, which explains the attraction of skepti-
cism.
If sensitivity is restricted to a set of (relevant) nearby worlds and radi-
cal deception worlds count as irrelevant, the difference with respect to 
radical skepticism vanishes. Still, there is something attractive about 
this argument, and A3 and A6 have to be addressed from the perspec-
tive of conditionals of (dis)connection.
Subjunctive conditionals are commonly understood as counterfactu-
als (corner conditionals ‘A > B’, box-arrow conditionals ‘A □→ B’—‘If it 
had been so that A, then it would have been so that B’). Sosa is some-
how idiosyncratic. He speaks about subjunctive conditionals, the arrow 
conditionals and strong conditionals: 
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My rough-and-ready conception of a (strong) conditional is this: sentence that 
expressively conditions something x on something y, either as a necessary or 
as a suffi cient condition. If a sentence expresses <p> as suffi cient for <q>, then 
its contrapositive is the same except only for negating each of ‘p’ and ‘q’ and 
inverting their positions (Sosa 2004b: 279).
Sosa avoids the counterfactual reading (of the type “If the subject had be-
lieved that p, then it would have been so that p”) and uses an arrow condi-
tional ‘p → q’, a defi nition of which can be extracted from various places:
…’x → y’ is short for ‘It would be so that x only if it were so that y’. This is 
to be distinguished from ‘If it had been so that x, then it would have been so 
that y’, which has unfortunate implicatures or worse (Sosa 2004a: 40).
‘r → p’…, (in an inequivalent but closely related alternative reading) as “Not 
easily would it be so that r without it being so that p.” (Sosa 2004a: 54).
And there are also more idiomatic variants, such as: <p> would be false only 
if <B(p)> were false (Sosa 2004b: 279).
It would not be so that p unless it were so that q (Sosa 2004b: 322, footnote 7).
Here ‘p → q’ will be short for ‘it would not be so that p without it being so 
that q’; or we might stipulate that in our usage it amounts to ‘that p sub-
junctively implies that q’; the idea is that its being so that p offers some 
guarantee, even if not an absolute guarantee, that it is also the case that 
q. The guarantee is as weak as that offered by the truth of “If I should next 
release this pencil (held aloft and unsupported, etc., in an actual speech 
context), then it would fall”(Sosa 2002: footnote 4, 284).
As a matter of fact, though perhaps not as a matter of strict necessity, not 
easily would p be the case without it being the case that q (Sosa 1999: 142).
One could roughly characterize Sosa’s conditionals as expressing a 
connection without direction. All the formulations avoid the sugges-
tion (common in the case of counterfactuals) that the antecedent of the 
conditional makes it the case, brings about, contributes causally to … 
, the occurrence of the consequent. I take this to be the “unfortunate 
implicatures” of the “If it had been so that p, then it would have been so 
that q” formulation feared by Sosa. When saying “I would believe that 
p on basis b only if p,” we want to avoid the suggestion that the truth 
of (the basis for) our belief somehow makes it the case, brings about, 
contributes causally to … , the fact that p. Modally stable connection 
is perhaps best expressed in terms of a negative formulation: “It would 
not be so that S believes that p on basis b without it being so that p,” 
and I have proposed a paraphrase: “Since S believes that p on basis b, 
it is true that p.”
Consider next Sosa’s typical formulation of a difference between 
safety and sensitivity:
S’s belief that p is safe iff it would not be true that S believes p without it 
being true that p, whereas it is sensitive iff it would not be true that not-p 
without it being true that S does not believe p. (More idiomatically a belief is 
safe iff it would be true if held, and sensitive iff it would not be held if false.) 
These being contrapositives, they are easily confused, or at least thought 
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equivalent; but contraposition is invalid for such conditionals (Sosa 2004b: 
276).
It is taken more or less for granted that subjunctive conditionals do not 
contrapose, but why, exactly? Here are some stock counter-examples 
from the literature:
“If Boris had gone to the party, Olga would still have gone. So if Olga had 
not gone, Boris would still not have gone.” Suppose that Boris wanted to go, 
but stayed away solely in order to avoid Olga, so the conclusion is false; but 
Olga would have gone all the more willingly if Boris had been there, so the 
premise is true (Lewis 1973: 35). 
The following story is the background for a counterexample to the argument 
form of contraposition or transposition (if A then B; therefore if not-B then 
not-A.): My dog is a mutt. His paternity is in some doubt, but even if his 
father were a purebred dog, my dog would still be a mutt since his mother 
was one. Now consider the contrapositive of the conditional claim made in 
this remark: if my dog were a purebred, his father would be a mutt. (I as-
sume that mutt and purebred are contra dictory properties, as applied to 
dogs.) This conditional is not only false, but impossible, and so cannot be 
a consequence of the true con ditional claim made in the story (Stalnaker 
1987: 124).
It can be true that A > C and ¬A > C: if I were to snap my fi ngers, the truck 
would go on rolling; if I were not to snap my fi ngers, the truck would go on 
rolling—yet if Contraposition were valid, this would entail both ¬C > ¬A and 
¬C > A, which is contradictory. It might be true that (even) if the British and 
Israelis had not attacked the Suez Canal in 1956, the Soviets would (still) 
have invaded Hungary later in the year, without its being true that if the 
Soviets had not invaded Hungary when they did it must have been the case 
that the British and Israelis had earlier attacked Suez (Bennett 2003: 172).
If water now fl owed from your kitchen faucet, for example, it would then be 
false that water so fl owed while your main house valve was closed. But the 
contrapositive of his true conditional is false (Sosa 2007: 25).
The list could be extended, but there is a common feature that all the 
counter-examples have in common—they have premises which we hear 
as containing a tacit ‘even’ or ‘still.’ Let us check the examples listed. 
Lewis’ conditional “If Boris had gone to the party, Olga would still have 
gone,” was redescribed as an even if by Hunter (1993: 285): 
It seems to me (1) that the premise is equivalent to an ‘even if’; (2) that the 
premise (which suggests that Boris’ presence would have been something 
of a deterrent to Olga) does not fi t the situation described (that Olga would 
have gone all the more willingly if Boris had been there); and (3) that the 
‘still’ in the conclusion is in the wrong place for a strict contrapositive.
Here are Stalnaker’s remarks about his own example:
One might reject the counterexample on the grounds that the conditional 
contraposed is an “even if” conditional—a semifactual which should receive 
an analysis different from the one given to ordinary counterfactual condi-
tionals (Stalnaker 1987: 124).
Bennett’s conditionals are clear cases of even ifs. How about Sosa’s 
housework problems? Contraposition would yield the absurd:
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If water fl owed from your kitchen faucet while your main house valve was 
closed, it would then be false that water now fl owed from your kitchen fau-
cet.
The structure of this conditional is not entirely perspicuous. An anal-
ogy with an old joke might help.
A pious man is praying to God to help him in his fi nancial troubles and 
make him a winner of a fair lottery. Year after year he prays for the win 
and then he dies, disappointedly, without ever winning the lottery. He com-
plains bitterly to God and receives a reply: “But why did you not buy a 
ticket, you miserable man!”
Here is the structure:
Even if S had won the lottery, it would still be false that S won while not 
buying a ticket (even God cannot make S a winner in that case!).
And the structure of Sosa’s example is the same: “Even if R, it would 
still not be the case that R without Q”:
Even if water now fl owed from your kitchen faucet, it would still be false 
that water so fl owed while your main house valve was closed.
Many took the failure of contraposition for subjunctives as an estab-
lished fact, but there were always opposing voices. According to Hunter 
(1993), contraposition is not valid for “even ifs” but “even ifs” differ from 
ordinary “ifs.” Goodman interpreted even-ifs as semifactuals which 
deny that a certain connection obtains between the antecedent and the 
consequent. Chisholm (1946: 298) suggested paraphrasing semifactu-
als before analyzing them. “Even if you were to sleep all morning, you 
would be tired” is to be read as a denial of the counterfactual connec-
tion: “It is false that if you were to sleep all morning, you would not be 
tired.” Semifactuals admit ‘even’ in the antecedent and ‘still’ in the con-
sequent and, according to the mainstream view, assert (or imply) their 
consequents. For Pollock (1976), the subjunctive “Even if A, C” is true 
only if C is true. However, not all “even ifs” seem to have a true con-
sequent. Suppose I win in a game of chess and we afterwards analyze 
a pawn c5 variation. “If I had sacrifi ced the bishop (in this variation), 
I would have lost,” I say, truly. But then I realize: “Even if I had not 
sacrifi ced the bishop, I would still have lost (in that variation).” Luckily 
for me, I did not choose the pawn c5 variation and won the game. Both 
conditionals seem to be true but they have a false consequent. Perhaps 
it is better to say that “P even if Q” implies Q no matter which of the 
relevant P-alternatives occurs, as suggested by Sanford (Sanford 1989: 
216). In our case—no matter what I do with my bishop, there was no 
connection between the moves of my bishop and my winning the game 
(in that c5 variation). In the case we are ultimately interested in—no 
matter what I do would make any difference to whether I know that the 
skeptical hypothesis is false, so even if I were to be radically deceived, 
I would still believe I was not.
There is a faint glimmer of hope for a consensus on the semantic 
classifi cation of even ifs. The fi eld has been dominated by unifi ers who 
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opt for a uniform treatment of all subjunctive conditionals (Stalnaker-
Lewis style), but there have always been dissenting voices arguing that 
“even ifs” belong to a special class with different properties. The view 
that “P even if Q” implies Q (no matter what) is not quite accurate, but 
it is nevertheless closely related to failures of contraposition. In the 
cases where “P > Q” is true, but “not-Q > not-P” is not, the probability 
of the consequent ‘Q’ is close to 1 (Adams 1998, 143) or, in different 
terms (Lowe 1995: 51), the negation of Q is contextually impossible. 
“If it rains tomorrow there will not be a terrifi c cloud burst,” does not 
contrapose to “if there is a terrifi c cloudburst tomorrow it will not rain,” 
because, in this context, apparently, a terrifi c cloudburst tomorrow is 
not a salient possibility and “Even if it rains tomorrow, there will still 
not be a terrifi c cloudburst” looks appropriate. This is an indicative, but 
most theoreticians would agree that inferences involving counterfac-
tual conditionals conform to many of the same laws as those involving 
indicatives.
We could also include “even ifs” in a broader category. Davis (1983) 
introduced a distinction between weak conditionals and strong condi-
tionals, arguing that any good conditional containing ‘then’ between 
its antecedent and its consequent remains good if ‘then’ is dropped; 
however, the converse does not hold, because some good conditionals 
lacking ‘then’ turn bad when ‘then’ is inserted into them (Lycan 2006: 
19). Here is Lycan’s example: (i) If you open the refrigerator, it will not 
explode; (ii) If you open the refrigerator, then it will not explode. The 
weak (i) would normally be used merely to reassure the hearer that 
there is nothing about opening the refrigerator that is connected with 
an explosion (“do not worry, even if you open it, …”) but the strong (ii) 
suggests that opening the refrigerator would keep it from exploding, 
perhaps because the refrigerator has been rigged to explode unless its 
door is opened in time. According to Lycan, weak conditionals are like 
semifactuals in that they readily take ‘even’ and they do not contra-
pose, but they do not so clearly assert their consequents. Furthermore, 
he adds that he knows of no purported counterexample to a contraposi-
tion that does not have such a weak conditional or a semifactual as a 
premise (Lycan 2006: 35)!
I will avoid a detailed analysis of the interactions between “even”, 
“if,” “still” and “then.” I will speak in general about weak conditionals 
(‘even ifs’) and robust (connection) conditionals. The latter contrapose 
validly, while the non-contraposing, weak conditionals contain the 
structure: “(Even) if …, (still) …” which signals a lack of connection.
5.
Let us return to matters epistemic. “Even if p were false, S would still 
believe that p on basis b,”10 is a non-contraposing weak conditional 
10 A weaker “Even if p were false, S might still believe that p on basis b,” 
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which expresses a lack of epistemic connection. Yet we expect robust 
conditionals, conditionals of connection, to contrapose within the limits 
of relevance. “Sensitive” beliefs (within limits) have their “safe” coun-
terparts (with sensitivity extended to all nearby worlds), but one should 
also be able to infer dependency from indication: “Since S believes that 
p on basis b, it is true that p,” therefore “If p were not the case, then 
S would not believe that p on basis b.” Normally this is the case: if a 
reliable thermometer indicates my having a fever, then, if I were not 
feverish, the thermometer would not indicate fever and I would not 
form this belief. Now, take the critical case of S’s true belief that she is 
not radically deceived. According to Sosa, this belief is safe but insen-
sitive, but we easily confuse safety with sensitivity because it is easy 
to assume that subjunctive conditionals contrapose. “Even if she were 
radically deceived, she would still believe that she is not,” seems to be 
true. Still, S’s actually true belief indicates that she is not radically 
deceived: “Since S believes that she is not radically deceived, she is not 
radically deceived,” does not look like a non-contraposing “even if.” So, 
dependency is violated but indication is not and Sosa’s diagnosis looks 
appropriate.
I think, however, that the proper diagnosis depends on (dis)con-
nections between the basis for the belief and the relevant facts of the 
matter. One could read “Since S believes that she is not radically de-
ceived, she is not radically deceived,” as a weak and non-contraposing 
conditional, on the model of even-ifs, where “P even if Q” implies “Q no 
matter what.” If S is not radically deceived “no matter what,” the prob-
ability of the consequent is close to 1, or, the realization of a skeptical 
scenario is contextually impossible or a remote possibility that does not 
count. Contraposition is then really invalid and dependency (sensitiv-
ity) fails, since it is not the case that if S were radically deceived, she 
would believe so. However, one could also read “Since S believes that 
she is not radically deceived, she is not radically deceived” as a robust 
conditional of connection and in this case its contrapose: “If she were 
radically deceived, she would not believe that she is not,” is also true. 
Let me explain these two options.
Alspector-Kelly (2011: 129–130) introduces an instructive distinc-
tion between “near-safety” and “far-safety.” If there are no nearby 
worlds in which a proposition believed is false, then the belief is, ac-
cording to Alspector-Kelly, automatically safe: it is not easily wrong 
simply because the proposition believed is not easily false. Such a belief 
is “far-safe,” with far-safe beliefs to believe is to know, no matter why 
you believe it. In a certain sense, the structure of modal space, the 
location of the actual world within the set of possible worlds, does “all 
the work.” Sosa sometimes speaks that way: “The possibility of radical 
when ‘might’ is restricted to the space of serious possibilities is enough to deny a 
connection but the stronger formulation is more common in discussions about the 
lack of knowledge and skepticism.
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deception is so outlandish that one’s belief to the contrary would tend 
to be correct” (Sosa 2010: 79). And “In the actual world, and for quite 
a distance away from the actual world, up to quite remote possible 
worlds, our belief that we are not radically deceived matches the fact 
as to whether we are or are not radically deceived” (Sosa 1999: 147).
On this reading S’s true belief that she is not radically deceived is 
really safe and insensitive, but satisfying standards that low should 
not really count in S’s epistemic credit. True, not easily would one false-
ly believe that one is not radically deceived without that actually being 
the case. Yet, one would also not easily believe almost anything with-
out it being the case that one is not radically deceived! No wonder that 
friends of sensitivity protest—this “knowledge” looks vacuous; S knows 
that p without being able to rule out any not-p worlds (Heller 1999: 
207; Dretske 2005: 22–23). The appeal to modal remoteness does not 
explain my knowledge that I am not radically deceived, it only analyzes 
it according to Becker (2007: 162, fn 24). Discrimination or the abil-
ity to tell apart would provide an explanation, but on this terrain the 
skeptic apparently wins—if I have no evidence that tells me I am not 
radically deceived, how can I know it? The conditional “Since S believes 
that she is not radically deceived, she is not radically deceived” is true 
but far-safety does not succeed in establishing the connection which 
explains the falsity of its contrapose, the insensitivity of this belief.
According to Alspector-Kelly (2011: 130) the knowledge of far-safe 
propositions in general and of the negation of the skeptical hypoth-
esis (“I am not radically deceived”) in particular “imposes no condi-
tions on the agent or her environment whatsoever (beyond, of course, 
those facts which ensure that the proposition’s negation is remote).” If 
there are worlds in which a proposition that p is false, which lie within 
the boundary of nearby worlds, then safety requires that the agent not 
believe that p in any such world. When this requirement is realized, 
some feature of the way things actually are with the agent and/or her 
environment rules out the existence of such worlds. These beliefs are 
“near-safe.” However, does it really follow that “... if the negation of the 
putatively known proposition is far, mere belief is enough, whereas if it 
is near, much more is required”? I do not think so. If modal distance is a 
function of the actual facts, if it is, e.g. because of the actual molecular 
structure of glass that it is fragile, then the actual facts about the cog-
nizer and her environment sometimes ground epistemic connections, 
even if the negation of the putatively known proposition is far away.
Far-safety is safety on (a)steroids, safety gone wild, which estab-
lishes a connection between A and B on the basis of the following for-
mula: “Not easily A without B because not easily not-B at all.” This 
looks like a spurious connection, close to disconnection, expressed as 
“even if A, still not-B.” However, there are types of genuine connections 
even when not-B is (in a certain contextual sense) out of the question: 
“Not easily A without B and not easily not B, but A is connected with 
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B.” Take, for example, a connection between cooling a glass of water 
and its freezing at zero degrees Celsius. The freezing point of water 
depends on pressure, but the connection is stable; the freezing tem-
perature of water would change by less than a degree if you increase 
the pressure by a factor of 100. Not an easy task; you would not easily 
cool the glass of water so that it froze at one degree Celsius, because 
you could not easily produce conditions which would realize this higher 
freezing point. Yet, if you change the environment radically (increase 
the pressure enormously), the connection is gone.
This, of course, invokes an externalistic perspective on epistemic 
connections. Remoteness of skeptical scenarios is established on the ba-
sis of actual categorical properties on the assumption that we are safely 
“placed” in a normal world and our beliefs meet appropriate external 
conditions. In a hostile environment, normal connections break down, 
but that is only to be expected. Consider, for example, externalism with 
regard to mental content. In order to have beliefs, it is necessary to be 
related to the environment in the right way. Given the radically dif-
ferent environment in skeptical scenarios, we would likely have access 
to few if any of the contents we actually have, and the connection is 
gone. However, it is then true, after all, that if I were a brain in a vat I 
would not believe I was not one. I would lack the conceptual resources 
required in order to believe anything about brains or vats (Sainsbury 
1997: 918–919). The connection is externalistically grounded, so indica-
tion (safety) now contraposes dependency (sensitivity)!
Friends of safety and friends of sensitivity alike make this exter-
nalistic assumption when explaining the possibility of ordinary knowl-
edge (and they face the same charge of begging the question against 
the skeptic). However, this externalistic move can be extended to our 
knowledge that we are not radically deceived. Epistemologists typi-
cally invoke a difference in the method of belief acquisition in order to 
make skeptical scenarios irrelevant. For Pritchard (2005: 156), safety 
requires that the agent’s belief be true in the actual world and in a wide 
class of nearby possible worlds in which the relevant initial conditions 
are the same as in the actual world— “and this will mean, in the basic 
case, that the agent at the very least forms the same belief in the same 
way as in the actual world.” Since, by defi nition, the brain in the vat is 
not using the same method as the agent in the good case, the skepti-
cal scenario is irrelevant (far-away). Of course, this move can be and 
has been mimicked by a friend of sensitivity. The modal condition that 
the belief in question, along with its truth, be replicated in relevantly 
similar possible worlds—worlds where the belief’s basis or its method 
of formation remain present, does not distinguish safety from sensitiv-
ity. Black (2002) employs the fact that Nozickian sensitivity must take 
explicit account of the methods of arriving at belief. The only worlds 
that are relevant to whether or not I know that p are those in which my 
belief is produced by the method that actually produces it. Skeptical 
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scenarios are supposed to be realized in possible worlds in which my 
belief is produced by different methods, so they are irrelevant.
More can be added to this external core; the belief that we are il-
lusion-free is rationally coherent within our overall view (Sosa 1999: 
147). To use Sosa’s well-known distinction, the “animal” externalistic 
perspective can be enhanced by refl ective knowledge. Ampliative infer-
ences like induction and inference to the best explanation provide a 
refl ective basis for a belief in the denial of skeptical hypothesis, and if 
plausibility is an acceptable standard then we are justifi ed in rejecting 
skeptical scenarios (Leplin 2009: 141). 
If skeptical scenarios are irrelevant and the basis for our belief that 
we are not radically deceived is appropriately connected with the facts 
of the matter then indication: “Since S believes that she is not radically 
deceived, she is not radically deceived,” is a robust conditional of con-
nection. In this case its contrapose, dependency: “If she were radically 
deceived, she would not believe that she is not,” is also true, within 
the limits of relevance. There are various strategies to implement his 
result. The simplest option is to interpret the irrelevance of skeptical 
scenarios as (perhaps contextual) impossibility and adopt the Lewisian 
strategy of interpreting counterfactuals with impossible antecedents 
as trivially true (on the model of “If pigs had wings …”). Recall (Cog-
burn and Roland 2013: 10):
A conditional of the form, “if it were the case that p, it would be the case 
that q,” is true in context C and world w just in case either (i) there is no p-
world or (ii) if there is a p-world, then all (C, w)-relevantly similar p-worlds 
are q-worlds.
In the case of “If she were radically deceived, she would not believe 
that she is not,” the condition (i) is fulfi lled. Two other options were 
also mentioned—a radically deceived person would not believe that she 
is not because she would lack the conceptual resources to form beliefs 
(Sainsbury 1997), or because her belief that she is not would be produced 
by methods other than actual, perceptual ones (Black 2002: 157).
6.
According to Sosa, we fi nd the position of the skeptic plausible because 
we confuse the sensitivity condition, which is incorrect, with the safety 
condition, which is correct, and we invalidly contrapose the latter and 
confuse it with the former. I have argued that the issue is more compli-
cated, as robust conditionals do contrapose; it is weak conditionals that 
do not. “Since S believes that she is not radically deceived, she is not 
radically deceived” is ambiguous between the weak reading (not radi-
cally deceived no matter what) and the robust—connection—reading. 
Its contrapose, “Even if she were radically deceived, she would still be-
lieve that she is not,” is true, given the disconnection reading, but false 
given the connection reading. Indication based on connection is exten-
sionally equivalent to dependency (within the limits of relevance).
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Does the insensitivity of one’s belief that one is not radically de-
ceived explain the attraction of skepticism? Insensitivity refl ects our 
intuitions about our inability to know the denial of a skeptical hypoth-
esis, but it does not really explain it. McGinn poses a legitimate ques-
tion when he asks what facts about the believer and her relation to 
the world make it true that if it weren’t the case that p she would not 
believe that p. He offers a capacity to tell the difference between true 
propositions and false ones within some given class of propositions as 
an explanation (“global reliability,” McGinn 1999: 17). On the face of it, 
dependency (sensitivity) more readily meets this explanatory require-
ment because we usually relate the agent’s responsiveness to changes 
to her capacity to discriminate. However, the same relation holds be-
tween robustness of the basis for the agent’s belief (safety) and her abil-
ity to tell apart. If S is unable to discriminate between relevant alterna-
tives then her true belief that p is not responsive to the falsity of p (it 
is not sensitive). Suppose that the falsity of p is a serious possibility: in 
this case her true belief that p might easily be false (it is unsafe). 
The critical question is always: when you actually believe that p 
on basis b, is it seriously possible for p to be false, but you continue to 
believe that p on the same basis? If so, then the connection is fragile 
and in this case even if not p, you might still believe that p. Yet “even 
if” is silent about the sources of disconnection. A reliabilist has a ready 
reply—one’s (un)reliability grounds the connection and the capacity to 
discriminate is the mark of reliability (Goldman 1976). In this spirit 
Sosa (2000: 42) agrees with Lehrer that the real source of skepticism is 
precisely the indescernibility condition:
If there is no discernible difference between that evidence I have for believ-
ing p if p were true and the evidence I would have for believing p if the 
denial of p were true, then I do not know that p on the evidence I have for 
believing that p (Lehrer 2000: 35).
The skeptic wants us to consider remote worlds in which the skeptical 
hypotheses are true and the evidence we have there is not reliable to 
conclude that it is not reliable in the actual world. However, of course, 
we have no means of distinguishing being in that condition from not 
being in that condition. This is the source of our oscillation between 
the connection and the disconnection interpretation of our belief that 
we are not radically deceived and the relevant facts of the matter. In 
the actual world, things being what they are, evidence is reliable, even 
if, in other worlds and other situations, it would not be. On the other 
hand, it seems that nothing we could do would make any difference to 
whether we know that the skeptical hypothesis is false, and that if it 
isn’t false. Connection seems to be purely a function of our standards 
of remoteness, not of our justifi cation. We are back to far-safety and its 
explanatory defi ciencies.
I think that considerations about the explanatory lacunae of modal 
epistemology led Sosa to a new requirement of aptness. Necessary true 
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propositions are the most striking examples of far-safety—there are no 
worlds in which such a proposition is false. Take a simple case of two 
mistakes in a mathematical proof that cancel each other out, resulting 
in the correct conclusion C (Miščević 2007: 49). Suppose that mistakes 
are extremely hard to detect, so that the thinker, call her Jane, is justi-
fi ed in trusting her calculation. Jane’s true belief in C is safe (neces-
sarily true, so there are no worlds where she believes falsely) but still 
lucky, so not knowledge. Miščević proposes that with respect to apriori 
(“armchair”) propositions we focus on the truth value of the belief that 
is formed in nearby possible worlds on the same basis as in the actual 
world, even when the resulting belief is not of the same proposition. 
Had Jane’s ways of thinking been slightly different, she would not have 
managed to arrive at the same true belief as in the actual world, she 
might have ended up with believing the negation of the target proposi-
tion. The agent’s belief is true in the actual world, but her cognitive 
structure and/or functioning might have differed in a minimal way 
from the actual one, and her beliefs would be false. However, once we 
see that characterization of luck should have a strong agent-concerning 
component, “we understand that exclusive focus upon modal instabil-
ity of truth(s) is unwarranted even in the a posteriori cases” (Miščević 
2007: 64).
The very idea of modal (or anti-luck) epistemology is now threat-
ened. The requirement of cognitive stability of the cognizer (Miščević 
2007: 67) corresponds to aptness. Sosa earlier (1999: 146) objected that 
sensitivity cannot deal with the problem of necessary truths (one can-
not make the supposition that they are false). He now recognizes that 
safety faces the same problem, given that belief of any necessary truth 
is automatically safe. Aptness, the manifestation of epistemic compe-
tence, is now required to account for the divide between beliefs in nec-
essary truths which are knowledge and those which are not (Sosa 2011: 
85). According to Sosa, aptness may perhaps suffi ce with no need of 
safety as a separate condition at all. One may wonder, however, wheth-
er with the decline of safety the Moorean anti-skeptical strategy is still 
an option.
In any case, modal epistemology in general is endangered. I do not 
have much to say about these objections in this paper, as I still believe 
that the main insight of modal epistemology will remain: if it is seri-
ously possible for S to falsely believe that p, then S fails to know that 
p. So let me summarize: the idea that what is distinctive about knowl-
edge is captured by certain conditionals should be explained in terms of 
conditionals of (dis)connection and not in terms of simple subjunctives. 
The epistemic modal connection between one’s basis for believing and 
the truth of one’s belief should be stable (it should hold throughout 
the space of nearby worlds) and responsive to changes—those which 
are relevant. The fact that the epistemic connection breaks down in an 
unfriendly environment is the lesson from externalism. Safety (stabil-
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ity) and sensitivity (responsiveness) are then two extensionally equiva-
lent aspects of one modal relation (within a restricted space of possible 
worlds) or one modal connection viewed from two perspectives.
Once we drop the requirements of sensitivity unlimited (we ignore 
far-away worlds) and sensitivity unique (we do not consider just the 
closest, one and only world), safety is no longer superior but equiva-
lent to sensitivity. Sosa often remarks that the requirements of safety 
and sensitivity are very similar and easily confused. It now seems that 
they go together through the good times (the heydays of modal epis-
temology) and the bad times (decline raised by problems of explana-
tion) alike. What if appearances are not misleading? To amalgamate 
Groucho Marx and David Lewis, one could equate them with a sotto 
voce proviso: Safety may look like Sensitivity and talk like Sensitivity, 
but don’t let that fool you—it really is Sensitivity! Psst!—within limits 
(which are diffi cult to specify).
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